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Abstract. This paper proposes a conceptually simple but expressive
framework for handling propositional information stemming from several
sources, namely a two-tiered propositional logic augmented with classi-
cal modal axioms (BC-logic), a fragment of the non-normal modal logic
EMN, whose semantics is expressed in terms of two-valued monotonic
set-functions called Boolean capacities. We present a theorem-preserving
translation of Belnap logic in this setting. As special cases, we can recover
previous translations of three-valued logics such as Kleene and Priest
logics. Our translation bridges the gap between Belnap logic, epistemic
logic, and theories of uncertainty like possibility theory or belief func-
tions, and paves the way to a unified approach to various inconsistency
handling methods.
1 Introduction
A number of works has been published proposing approaches that deal with 
inconsistent knowledge bases in such a way as to extract useful information 
from them in a non-explosive way [5,18]. Inconsistency is often due to the pres-
ence of multiple sources providing information. Belnap 4-valued logic [4] is one  
of the earliest approaches to this problem. It is based on a very natural set-up 
where each source tentatively assigns truth-values to elementary propositions. 
The sets of truth-values thus collected for these propositions are summarized by 
so-called epistemic truth-values referring to whether sources are in conflict or not, 
informed or not. There are 4 such epistemic truth-values, two of which referring 
to ignorance and conflict. Truth tables for conjunction, disjunction, and nega-
tion are used to compute the epistemic status of other complex formulas. This 
approach underlies both Kleene three-valued logic (when no conflict between 
sources is observed) and the Priest three-valued logic of paradox [16] (sources 
are never ignorant and assign truth-values to all elementary propositions).
Besides, inconsistency and incompleteness are present in uncertainty theo-
ries as well, using monotonic set-functions called capacities with values in the 
unit interval, instead of logics. The simplest logical framework for incomplete
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information is the two-tiered propositional logic MEL [3], that accounts for an all-
or-nothing view of possibility theory [11], and borrows axiomsK andD frommodal
epistemic logic. Replacing necessity measures by general inclusion-monotonic set-
functions can account for the idea of conflicting sources of information. It leads to
adopting a fragment of the non-normal modal logic EMN [7] as a general logical
framework, which can encompass variants of probabilistic and belief function
logics, for instance the logic of risky knowledge [15], where the adjunction rule
is not valid. Here, we show that our two-tiered propositional setting related to
EMN can encode Belnap 4-valued logic, namely that the four truth-values in
Belnap logic are naturally expressed by means of capacities taking values on
{0, 1}. Thus, we construct a bridge between Belnap logic and uncertainty the-
ories. As special cases, we recover our previous translations of Kleene logic for
incomplete information [8] and Priest logic of paradox [9]. Showing the possi-
bility of this translation indicates that our logic has potential to support other
inconsistency handling approaches as well. The paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents the propositional logic of Boolean capacities BC and shows
its capability to capture the notion of information coming from several sources.
Section 3 recalls Belnap 4-valued logic from the point of view of its motivation,
its syntactical inference and its semantics. Section 4 contains the main results
pertaining to the translation of Belnap logic into BC. Most proofs are omitted
due to length constraints.
2 The Logic of Boolean Capacities and Multisource
Information Management
In this section, we consider an approach to the handling of pieces of incomplete
and conflicting information coming from several sources. We show, following an
intuition already suggested in [1,12] that if we represent each body of information
items supplied by each source by means of a set of possible states of affairs,
the collective information supplied by the sources can be modelled in a lossless
way by a monotonic set function (called a capacity) that takes value on {0, 1}.
These set-functions can serve as natural multisource semantics for a simple flat
non-regular modal logic that captures the four Belnap truth-values as already
suggested in [10]. This logic looks rather uncommitting for handling multiple
source information, while other approaches seem to put additional assumptions.
2.1 Boolean Capacities and Multisource Information
Consider a standard propositional language L with variables V = {a, b, c, . . . }
and connectives ∧,∨,¬, for conjunction, disjunction and negation, respectively.
We denote the propositional formulas of L by letters p, q, . . . . Consider a set of
states of affairs Ω which is the set of interpretations of this language.
Definition 1. A capacity (or fuzzy measure) is a mapping γ : 2Ω → [0, 1] such
that γ(∅) = 0; γ(Ω) = 1; and if A ⊆ B then γ(A) ≤ γ(B).
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The value γ(A) can be interpreted as the degree of support of a proposition p
represented by the subset A = [p] of its models. A Boolean capacity (B-capacity,
for short) is a capacity with values in {0, 1}. It can be defined from a usual
capacity and any threshold λ > 0 as β(A) = 1 if γ(A) ≥ λ and 0 otherwise.
The useful information in a B-capacity consists of its focal sets. A focal set
E is such that β(E) = 1 and β(E\{w}) = 0,∀w ∈ E. Let Fβ be the set of focal
sets of β. They are minimal sets for inclusion such that β(E) = 1: we can check
that β(A) = 1 if and only if there is a subset E of A in Fβ with β(E) = 1.
Consider n sources providing information in the form of epistemic states
modelled by non-empty sets Ei ⊆ Ω: it is only known from source i that the real
state of affairs s should lie in Ei. A capacity β can be built from these pieces of
information then viewed as the set Fβ = {E1, E2, . . . , En} of its focal subsets.
Then β([p]) = 1 really means that there is at least one source i that believes
that p is true (that is p is true in all states of affairs in Ei). Note that this way
of synthetizing information is not destructive: it preserves every initial piece of
information. Given a proposition p, there are four epistemic statuses based on
the information from sources, that can be described by the capacity:
– Support of p: β([p]) = 1 and β([¬p]) = 0. Then p is asserted by at least one
source and negated by no other one.
– Rejection of p: β([¬p]) = 1 and β([p]) = 0. Then p is negated by at least one
source and asserted by no other one.
– Ignorance about p: β([p])= β([¬p])=0. No source supports nor negates p.
– Conflict about p: β([p]) = β([¬p]) = 1. Some sources assert p, some negate it.
Important special cases are
– when β is minitive, i.e., β(A ∩ B) = min(β(A), β(B)). It is then a necessity
measure and Fβ = {E}. There is only one source and its information is
incomplete, but there is no conflict.
– when the focal sets are singletons {ei}. Then β is maxitive, i.e., β(A ∪ B) =
max(β(A), β(B)). All sources have complete information, so there are con-
flicts, but no ignorance. Letting E = {e1, e2, . . . , en}, then β(A) = 1 if and
only if A∩E = ∅, formally a possibility measure. But here E is a conjunction
of non-mutually exclusive elements, not a possibility distribution.
2.2 The Logic BC
To provide a logical setting to the above situation, we build a higher level propo-
sitional language L on top of L, whose formulas are denoted by Greek letters
φ, ψ, . . . , and defined by: if p ∈ L then p ∈ L; if φ, ψ ∈ L then ¬φ ∈ L,
φ ∧ ψ ∈ L. Note that the language L is not part of L, it is embedded in it,
since atomic variables of L are of the form p, p ∈ L. As usual ♦p stands for
¬¬p. It defines a very elementary fragment of a modal logic language [3].
A minimal logic for B-capacities has been proposed using the language L
[12]. It is a two-tiered propositional logic plus some modal axioms:
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1. All axioms of propositional logics for L-formulas.
2. The modal axioms:
(RM) p → q if  p → q in propositional logic.
(N) p, whenever p is a propositional tautology.
(P) ♦p, whenever p is a propositional tautology.
The only rule is modus ponens: If ψ and ψ → φ then φ. This is a fragment
of the non-regular logic EMN [7]. Note that the two dual modalities  and ♦
play the same role. Namely the above axioms remain valid if we exchange  and
♦. So these modalities are not distinguishable. Semantics is usually expressed in
terms of neighborhood semantics, but it can be equivalently expressed in terms of
B-capacities on the set of interpretations Ω of the language L. We have indicated
elsewhere [10] that the set of subsets A such that β(A) = 1 is a special case of
neighborhood family in the sense of neighborhood semantics [7]. This logic can
thus be called the logic of Boolean Capacities (BC). A BC-model of an atomic
formula p is a B-capacity β. The satisfaction of BC-formulas is defined as:
– β |= p, if and only if β([p]) = 1;
– β |= ¬φ, β |= φ ∧ ψ in the standard way.
Semantic entailment is defined classically, and syntactic entailment is classical
propositional entailment taking RM, N, P as axioms: Γ BC φ if and only if
Γ ∪ {all instances of RM,N,P}  φ (classically defined). It has been proved
that BC logic is sound and complete wrt B-capacity models [12]. In fact, axiom
RM clearly expresses the monotonicity of capacities, and it is easy to realize that
a classical propositional interpretation of L that respects the axioms of BC can
be precisely viewed as a B-capacity.
As a B-capacity precisely encodes a set of sources each delivering incomplete
information items in the form of an n-tuple of focal sets (E1, E2, . . . , En), we can
see that β |= p if and only if ∃i : Ei ⊆ [p], so we may write (E1, E2, . . . , En) |= ϕ
in place of β |= ϕ. Denoting by ip the statement Ei ⊆ [p], the formula p is of
the form 1p∨· · ·∨np where i is a standard KD modality in a regular modal
logic. Likewise, ♦p = ¬¬p = ¬1¬p ∧ · · · ∧ ¬n¬p = ♦1p ∧ · · · ∧ ♦np clearly
means that no source is asserting ¬p. The four epistemic statuses of propositions
in L can then be expressed by means of modal formulas in L as follows [10]:
– Support of p: (E1, E2, . . . , En) |= p ∧ ♦p
– Rejection of p: (E1, E2, . . . , En) |= ¬p ∧ ♦¬p
– Ignorance about p: (E1, E2, . . . , En) |= ♦p ∧ ♦¬p
– Conflict about p: (E1, E2, . . . , En) |= p ∧ ¬p
Note that this framework is very cautious, in the sense that inferences made are
minimal ones one can expect to make from multisource information. If we add
axioms K and D of modal logics, then β is forced to be a necessity measure,
and the conflict situation disappears: there is only one source with epistemic
set E driving β. We get the logic MEL [3], a fragment of the logic KD. In case
we restrict to capacities β whose focal sets are singletons, the  modality has
all properties of a KD possibility modality ♦. It is a kind of mirror image of
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logic MEL where conflict is taken into account but there is no ignorance. It can
capture Priest logic of paradox [9]. The aim of this paper is to show that the
general framework of BC-logic can encode Belnap logic as a special case.
3 Belnap 4-Valued Logic
Belnap [4] considers an artificial information processor, fed from a variety of
sources, and capable of answering queries on propositions of interest. The basic
assumption is that the computer receives information about atomic propositions
in a cumulative way from outside sources, each asserting for each atomic propo-
sition whether it is true, false, or being silent about it. The notion of epistemic
set-up is defined as an assignment, of one of four values denoted by T, F, C, U,
to each atomic proposition a, b, . . .:
1. Assigning T to a means the computer has only been told that a is true (1)
by at least one source, and false (0) by none.
2. Assigning F to a means the computer has only been told that a is false by at
least one source, and true by none.
3. Assigning C to a means the computer has been told at least that a is true by
one source and false by another.
4. Assigning U to a means the computer has been told nothing about a.
Table 1. Belnap disjunction, conjunction and negation
∨ F U C T
F F U C T
U U U T T
C C T C T
T T T T T
∧ F U C T
F F F F F
U F U F U
C F F C C
T F U C T
a ¬a
F T
U U
C C
T F
If {0, 1} is the set of usual truth values (as assigned by the information sources),
then the set V4 = {T,F,C,U} of epistemic truth values coincides with the
power set of {0, 1}, letting T = {1}, F = {0}. According to the convention
initiated by Dunn [13], U represents the empty set and corresponds to no infor-
mation received, while C = {0, 1} represents the presence of conflicting sources,
expressing true and false at the same time. Belnap’s approach relies on two
orderings in V4 = {T,F,C,U}, equipping it with two lattice structures:
– The information ordering,  whose meaning is “less informative than”, such
that U  T  C;U  F  C. This ordering reflects the inclusion relation of
the sets ∅, {0}, {1}, and {0, 1}. (V4,) is the information lattice.
– The truth ordering, <t, representing “more true than” according to which
F <t C <t T and F <t U <t T, each chain reflecting the truth-set of Kleene’s
logic. In other words, ignorance and conflict play the same role with respect
to F and T according to this ordering. It yields the logical lattice, based on
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the truth ordering, and the interval extension of standard connectives ∧, ∨
and ¬ from {0, 1} to 2{0,1}\{∅}. In this lattice, the maximum of U and C is
T and the minimum is F.
The syntax is the one of propositional logic. Connectives of negation, con-
junction and disjunction are defined truth-functionally in Belnap 4-valued logic
(see Table 1). Belnap 4-valued logic has no tautologies, but it has an inference
system. It can be defined only via a set of inference rules, as those that can be
found in [14,17]:
Definition 2. Let a, b, c ∈ V . The inference system of Belnap 4-valued logic is
defined by no axiom and the following set of rules
(R1) :
a ∧ b
a
(R2) :
a ∧ b
b
(R3) :
a b
a ∧ b (R4) :
a
a ∨ b
(R5) :
a ∨ b
b ∨ a (R6) :
a ∨ a
a
(R7) :
a ∨ (b ∨ c)
(a ∨ b) ∨ c
(R8) :
a ∨ (b ∧ c)
(a ∨ b) ∧ (a ∨ c) (R9) :
(a ∨ b) ∧ (a ∨ c)
a ∨ (b ∧ c) (R10) :
a ∨ c
¬¬a ∨ c
(R11) :
¬(a ∨ b) ∨ c
(¬a ∧ ¬b) ∨ c (R12) :
¬(a ∧ b) ∨ c
(¬a ∨ ¬b) ∨ c (R13) :
¬¬a ∨ c
a ∨ c
(R14) :
(¬a ∧ ¬b) ∨ c
¬(a ∨ b) ∨ c (R15) :
(¬a ∨ ¬b) ∨ c
¬(a ∧ b) ∨ c
These rules express that conjunction is idempotent and distributes over disjunc-
tion, disjunction is idempotent, associative and distributes over conjunction.
Negation is involutive and De Morgan Laws are satisfied. It makes clear that the
underlying algebra is a De Morgan algebra [17]. Applying these rules, formulas
can be put in normal form as a conjunction of clauses, i.e., p = p1∧. . .∧pn, where
the pi’s are disjunctions of literals lij = a or ¬a where a ∈ V . For the semantics,
consider again the four epistemic truth-values forming the set V4 = {F,U,C,T}.
A Belnap valuation is a mapping vb : L → V4. Let Γ ⊆ L and p ∈ L, then we
define the consequence relation by means of the truth ordering ≤t as
Γ B p iff ∃p1, . . . , pn ∈ Γ, ∀vb vb(p1) ∧ . . . ∧ vb(pn) ≤t vb(p)
Now, let us consider the consequence relations U ,C obtained by the des-
ignated values {U,T} or {C,T}, respectively defined as:
Γ U p : ∀vb if vb(pi) ∈ {U,T},∀pi ∈ Γ, then vb(p) ∈ {U,T};
Γ C p : ∀vb if vb(pi) ∈ {C,T},∀pi ∈ Γ, then vb(p) ∈ {C,T}.
Font [14] proves the following result: Γ B p iff Γ U p and Γ C p. More-
over, due to the symmetric role that {U,T} and {C,T} play in Belnap’s logic,
the two relations Γ U p and Γ C p are equivalent: Γ U p iff Γ C p. The
adequacy with the Hilbert-style axiomatization of Belnap logic and the above
semantics is proved by Pynko [17] and Font [14]:
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Theorem 1. Belnap logic is sound and complete with respect to Belnap seman-
tics, that is Γ B p iff Γ B p using the 15 rules Ri, i = 1, . . . , 15.
Kleene logic has truth tables obtained from Belnap logic’s by deleting the truth-
value C, and has designated truth-value T. Priest logic is obtained by deleting
the truth-value U, keeping C, T as designated. From a syntactic point of view,
Kleene logic has one more inference rule than Belnap 4-valued logic, e.g., q∧¬q 
p ∨ ¬p, while Priest logic is Belnap logic plus one axiom (p ∨ ¬p, see [14,17]).
4 A Translation of Belnap Logic into BC
The above results, joined with the fact that Kleene logic and Priest logic can be
translated into MEL [8,9] strongly suggest that Belnap logic can be expressed in
BC. Formulas in BC can be related to Belnap truth-values T, F, U, C in an obvi-
ous way, provided that we restrict to atomic formulas. Let T be the translation
operation that changes a partial Belnap truth-value assignment vb(a) ∈ Θ ⊆ V4
to an atomic propositional formula a, into a modal formula, indicating its epis-
temic status w.r.t a set of sources. In agreement with the multisource semantics
of the BC logic, we let T (vb(a) ≥t C) = a and T (vb(a) ≤t C) = ¬a. Like-
wise T (vb(a) ≥t U) = ♦a, T (vb(a) ≤t U) = ♦¬a. Hence, we get the modal
translation of the four Belnap epistemic values:
T (vb(a) = T) = a ∧ ♦a T (vb(a) = F) = ¬a ∧ ♦¬a
T (vb(a) = U) = ♦a ∧ ♦¬a T (vb(a) = C) = a ∧ ¬a
In Belnap logic, though, sources provide information only on these elementary
propositions, valuations for other propositions being obtained via truth-tables.
The translation of Belnap truth-qualified formulas will be carried out using the
truth-tables of the logic, which means that in all formulas of L that can be
reached via the translation, only literals appear in the scope of modalities.
Let us consider the fragment of BC language where we can only put a modal-
ity in front of literals: L = a|¬a|¬φ|φ ∧ ψ|φ ∨ ψ. We can proceed to the
translation of Belnap truth-tables into BC. First consider negation. It is easy to
check that T (vb(¬p) = T) = T (vb(p) = F), T (vb(¬p) = x) = T (vb(p) = x),
T (vb(¬p) ≥t x) = T (vb(p) ≤t x), x ∈ {U,C}. On compound formulas built
with conjunction and disjunction, it is clear that T (vb(p∧ q) = T) = T (vb(p) =
T) ∧ T (vb(q) = T) but, due to the distributive lattice structure of V4, we have
T (vb(p ∨ q) = T) = T (vb(p) = T) ∨ T (vb(q) = T) ∨ (T (vb(p) = U) ∧ T (vb(p) =
C)) ∨ (T (vb(p) = C) ∧ T (vb(p) = U)).
For elementary formulas ¬a, a ∨ b, a ∧ b of Belnap logic, we get explicit
translations using the truth-tables of Belnap logic, for instance:
T (vb(¬a) = T) = T (vb(a) = F)
T (vb(¬a) = U) = T (vb(a) = U); T (vb(¬a) = C) = T (vb(a) = C)
T (vb(¬a) ≥t C) = T (vb(a) ≤t C) = ¬a
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T (vb(a ∧ b) = T) = a ∧ ♦a ∧ b ∧ ♦b
T (vb(a ∨ b) = T) = (a ∧ ♦a) ∨ (b ∧ ♦b) ∨ (Ca ∧ Ub) ∨ (Ua ∧ Cb)
T (vb(a ∧ b) ≥t U) = ♦a ∧ ♦b; T (vb(a ∧ b) ≥t C) = a ∧ b
T (vb(a ∨ b) ≥t U) = ♦a ∨ ♦b; T (vb(a ∨ b) ≥t C) = a ∨ b
where ♦a ∧ ♦¬a is shortened as Ua and a ∧ ¬a as Ca. Belnap logic has
two designated values: T and C. So, for inference purposes, we use translated
semantic expressions T (vb(p) ≥t C). According to this translation, Belnap logic
reaches the following fragment of BC-language: LB = a|¬a|φ∧ψ|φ∨ψ without
negation in front of . Conversely, from the fragment LB we can go back to
Belnap logic. Namely any formula in LB can be translated into a formula of the
propositional logic language as follows: a maps to a and ¬a to ¬a; θ(ψ ∧ φ)
to θ(ψ) ∧ θ(φ) and θ(ψ ∨ φ) to θ(ψ) ∨ θ(φ). We remark that a ∨ ¬a is not
a tautology in BC, and in general no tautologies can be expressed in the above
fragment. This is coherent with the fact that Belnap logic has no theorems.
Theorem 2. Let φ/ψ be any of the 15 inference rules of Belnap logic. Then,
the following inference rule is valid in BC:
T (vb(φ) ≥t C)
T (vb(ψ) ≥t C)
As a consequence we can mimic syntactic inference of Belnap logic in BC, more
precisely restricting to formulas in LB. The restriction of the scope of modalities
to literals also affects the set of B-capacities that can act as a semantic coun-
terpart of the logic. We can check that semantic inference in Belnap logic can
be expressed in the modal setting of BC by restricting the capacities that can
be used as models of LB formulas. Namely, consider a Belnap set-up where each
source i provides a set Ti of atoms considered true by this source, a set Fi of atoms
considered false by this source, where Ti∩Fi = ∅. It corresponds to a special kind
of epistemic state with rectangular shape, namely: Ei = [(
∧
a∈Ti a)∧(
∧
b∈Fi ¬b)].
As there are n sources of this kind, we can restrict to B-capacities β with
such rectangular focal sets. In fact, as atoms of LB are of the form  where
 is a literal, and as we cannot put  in front of conjunctions nor disjunctions,
it is enough to use capacities whose focal sets are of the form [a], a ∈ ∪ni=1Ti
and [¬b], b ∈ ∪ni=1Fi to interpret formulas in LB. We call such capacities atomic.
Considering the Belnap valuation vb associated to the information supplied by
n sources, there is a one-to-one correspondence between Belnap valuations and
atomic B-capacities α induced by this information:
Proposition 1. For any B-capacity β, there is a single Belnap valuation vbβ
such that β |= φ if and only if vbβ(θ(φ)) ∈ {C,T}.
The idea is to let vbβ(a) = T if β([a]) = 1 and β([¬a]) = 0, vbβ(a) = F if
β([a]) = 0 and β([¬a]) = 1, etc. In the other way around,
Proposition 2. For each Belnap valuation vb, there exists a unique atomic B-
capacity αvb such that vb |= p if and only if αvb |= T (vb(p) ≥t C).
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Indeed, define T = {a : vb(a) = T or C}, F = {a : vb(a) = F or C}, and let
α([a]) = 1 if a ∈ T , α([¬a]) = 1 if a ∈ F . However there are several Belnap
set-ups inducing a given Belnap valuation vb: for instance only two sources are
enough to model the four values [6]. We thus introduce an equivalence relation
on the set of B-capacities, whereby two of them are equivalent if they correspond
to the same Belnap truth assignment: β ∼B β′ if and only if vbβ = vbβ′ .
Proposition 3. For any B-capacity β, there exists an atomic B-capacity α such
that β ∼B α.
Indeed, consider β with focal sets E1, . . . En. Let Ti = {a ∈ V : Ei ⊆ [a]} and
Fi = {b ∈ V : Ei ⊆ [¬b]}. The focal sets of α are based on such literals and form
the family
Fα = {[a] : a ∈ ∪ni=1Ti} ∪ {[¬b] : b ∈ ∪ni=1Fi}.
From Proposition 3 we can conclude that for any B-capacity β, there exists an
atomic B-capacity α ∼B β such that β |= φ ∈ LB if and only if α |= φ. We then
can prove that our translation of Belnap logic into BC is consequence-preserving:
Theorem 3. Let Γ be a set (conjunction) of formulas in propositional logic
interpreted in Belnap logic, and p be another such formula. Then Γ B p if and
only if {T (vb(q) ≥t C) : q ∈ Γ} BC T (vb(q) ≥t C).
Proof. Suppose Γ B p. Then from Theorem2, all inference rules of Belnap
logic become valid inferences in BC using the translations of their premises and
conclusions. So the inference can be made in BC. Conversely, by completeness
of BC, suppose ∀β, if β |= T (vb(q) ≥t C),∀q ∈ Γ then β |= T (vb(p) ≥t C).
Using Proposition 3, for all B-capacities β, ∃α ∼B β, where α is atomic, such
that ∀q ∈ Γ , α |= T (vb(q) ≥t C) if and only if β |= T (vb(q) ≥t C) and
α |= T (vb(p) ≥t C) if and only if β |= T (vb(p) ≥t C). Then, we have that if
vb(q) ≥t C,∀q ∈ Γ then vb(p) ≥t C for the Belnap valuation vb associated to
α. So Γ |=B p. By completeness of Belnap logic, Γ B p follows. unionsq
We can recover our previous translations of three-valued Kleene logic and
the logic of paradox into the logic MEL [8,9], from our translation of Belnap
logic into BC, by translating into BC the properties added to Belnap logic to
recover these logics. Namely Kleene logic is obtained by adding the inference
rule q ∧ ¬q  p ∨ ¬p to Belnap logic, which comes down to adding inference rule
(KL) : q ∧ ¬q  p ∨ ¬p to BC. A simpler approach is to add axiom D
(p → ♦p) to BC. To recover Priest logic from Belnap’s, axiom p ∨ ¬p must be
added, which means adding to BC the (unusual) axiom p ∨ ¬p [9].
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have pursued our work regarding a class of many-valued logics
dealing with inconsistent or incomplete information processing [8,9]. Just like
Kleene logic and Priest’s logic of paradox in MEL, we can capture Belnap 4-
valued logics in a simple two-tiered propositional logic couched in the language of
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modal logic EMN involving only depth-1 formulas. The natural semantics for this
propositional logic is in terms of all-or-nothing set-functions that model Belnap
set-ups and capture both incomplete and inconsistent pieces of information. The
use of set-functions clarifies the connection between Belnap 4-valued logic and
uncertainty modeling. The use of set-functions beyond possibility and necessity
measures is in agreement with the fact that propositions in Belnap 4-valued
logics cannot be viewed as S5-like beliefs. The logic BC is cautious enough to be
a general setting for modeling incomplete and inconsistent logical information.
It subsumes Belnap 4-valued logic, doing away with the restriction to literals,
and accounting for generalized Belnap set-ups considered by Avron et al. [2].
It seems that our framework may be used to capture various approaches to
inconsistent and incomplete information handling; for instance, the one based on
maximal consistent subsets could be obtained by considering B-capacities such
that β(A ∩ B) = min(β(A), β(B)) if A ∩ B = ∅. Moreover it can be extended to
handling degrees of support. This is to be explored in the future.
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